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The Early Heidegger’s Phenomenology Abstract:		 This	paper	attempts	to	shed	some	light	on	Heidegger’s	early	conception	of	phenomenology	in	light	of	its	conscious	departure	from	Husserl’s	conception	of	phenomenology.	The	period	in	question	extends	from	Heidegger’s	first	Freiburg	lectures	in	1919	to	his	return	to	Freiburg	from	Marburg	in	the	fall	of	1928.	After	flagging	some	prima	facie	differences	between	their	phenomenological	projects	during	these	years,	I	suggest	how	Heidegger	adapts	into	his	phenomenology	four	basic	aspects	of	Husserl’s	phenomenology	(the	phenomenological	reduction,	formalization,	and	the	performative	and	constitutive	aspects	of	the	analysis).		In	conclusion	I	call	attention	to	a	fundamental,	arguably	irreconcilable	difference	between	their	phenomenologies.	
 
Is Heidegger a phenomenologist? Was he ever a phenomenologist? To be sure, in lecture 
after lecture from 1919 to 1928, he repeatedly identifies his investigations as 
phenomenological. At the start of his career in Freiburg, he had regular, storied 
conversations with Edmund Husserl, the thinker most responsible for elaborating 
phenomenology as a philosophical discipline in the early 20th century. Husserl welcomed 
their exchanges, entrusted Heidegger with many a manuscript, and greatly facilitated 
Heidegger’s academic career. In 1928, presumably before delving deeply into 
Heidegger’s Being and Time, Husserl reportedly tells him: “You and I are 
phenomenology” (Cairns 1976: 9).1 
Yet anyone coming from the study of Husserl to the early Heidegger’s courses is 
bound to have serious doubts about Heidegger’s phenomenological credentials. Although 
explicit and open criticism of Husserl’s phenomenology is apparent in lectures only after 
Heidegger’s move to Marburg, there is ample evidence – some of it summarized below – 
																																																								
1 In a late 1926 draft of a letter to Heidegger, Husserl writes: “No one has greater faith in 
you than I.” I am indebted to Walter Hopp for invaluable help with this paper and to 
Zachary Joachim and James Kinkaid for critical readings of it. 
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of his departure from Husserl’s phenomenology already in his first Freiburg lectures, 
1919-1923.2 So it would come at no surprise to someone attending his early lectures to 
hear of his remark to Jaspers, shortly before the appearance of Being and Time, that if it 
is written against anyone, it is against Husserl (Heidegger/Jaspers: 62-64, 71). For his 
part, Husserl recognized, albeit all too late, that what Heidegger calls phenomenology is, 
in Husserl’s view, a travesty of phenomenology and, indeed, nothing more than a version 
of philosophical anthropology (Husserl 1994a: 184; 1994b: 254, 476; Breeur 1994: 13). 
Responding to this criticism in 1930, Heidegger advises his students to reserve the title 
‘phenomenology’ for what Husserl has achieved and will achieve (Heidegger 1997: 40). 
In the years that followed, Heidegger largely follows his own advice. 
The advice further adds to the puzzle of what Heidegger meant in the 1920s when 
he designates what he is doing as ‘phenomenology.’ Indeed, to the extent that he 
recognizes any continuity between his early and later thought, the advice suggests that he 
did not regard what is of value in the early work as necessarily falling under the rubric of 
‘phenomenology’ at all.3 To be sure, these points are less than substantive and Heidegger 
may not be a faithful interpreter of his development (nor, given the volume of lectures 																																																								
2 von Herrmann (2000: 9-98), for example, reads his first Freiburg lecture as a 
repudiation of Husserl’s “reflective” phenomenology; but see Thomas Nenon’s July 28, 
2014 review in Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, and Zahavi 2003: 167-171. 
3 Despite his disavowals, Heidegger’s later thinking arguably continues to exemplify 
transcendental phenomenology under another rubric (given the abiding role of Dasein in 
it). Eminent scholars (Crowell 2013, Sheehan 2016) argue that Heidegger remained a 
phenomenologist from beginning to end.  
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and writings, would it be reasonable to expect him to be). Nevertheless, when taken 
together with the sharp differences between the two thinkers, the problem raised by these 
considerations is patent. What in the world does Heidegger have in mind by self-styling 
his investigations in the 1920s as phenomenology? Is his use of the term, when read 
alongside Husserl’s use, simply an equivocation? Does it make sense, in the end, for 
Heidegger to be deemed – or, for that matter, to have deemed himself – a 
phenomenologist? Certainly, from a Husserlian point of view, it can be hard to see how. 
Still, if he was not exactly a card-carrying Husserlian phenomenologist in the 1920s, 
what explains his characterization (or mis-characterization) of his own investigations as 
phenomenology?  
The main objective of this paper is to try to answer this last question. More 
precisely, the aim is to shed some light on Heidegger’s conception of phenomenology 
during this time in light of its conscious departure from Husserl’s phenomenology. The 
period in question extends from Heidegger’s first Freiburg lectures in 1919 to his return 
to Freiburg from Marburg in the fall of 1928.  
Critical engagement with Husserl’s work is by no means the only source of the 
early Heidegger’s phenomenology. In keeping with the purpose of the present volume, 
the first part of this paper identifies major influences on his early thought. The second 
part of the paper returns to its main objective. After flagging the prima facie differences 
between Husserl’s and Heidegger’s phenomenological projects, I suggest how Heidegger 
can nonetheless plausibly lay claim to the mantle – or even a mantle – of 
phenomenology.  
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1. Major influences on early Heidegger’s phenomenology 
In the early 1920s there are arguably five major influences on Heidegger’s early thought: 
(1) Husserlian phenomenology; (2) the efforts of Dilthey and the so-called “Southwest” 
school of Neo-Kantianism (Windelband, Rickert, Lask) to elaborate the distinctiveness of 
historical understanding and worldly experience; (3) Natorp’s psychology and criticisms 
of Husserl’s phenomenology; (4) the formal indications provided by Pauline-Augustinian 
religious exhortations, viewed through the lens of “the young Luther” and Kierkegaard; 
and (5) Aristotle’s conceptions of the inherent mobility (κινήσις) of being and being-in-
the-world – Aristotle’s “ontology of life” (not nature) as well as his interpretation of 
practical understanding (φρόνησις) as a distinctive manner of uncovering things 
(ἀληθεύειν) (Heidegger 2002: 322-329; 2004a: 184; 2005: 382-386).4 Another 
unmistakable influence becomes discernible mid-way through the decade, particularly as 
he is putting the finishing touches on Sein und Zeit: (6) the transcendental subject in 
Kant’s theoretical philosophy and Marburg Neo-Kantian readings of the latter (Heidegger 
1977: 431; Dahlstrom 1991). No historical treatment of the early Heidegger’s thinking 
would be complete that did not trace his critical engagement with each of these historical 
influences.  
																																																								
4 See, too, Heidegger 1988: 5: “Begleiter im Suchen war der junge Luther und Vorbild 
Aristoteles, den jener haßte. Stöße gab Kierkegaard, und die Augen hat mir Husserl 
eingesetzt.” Though unmentioned by Heidegger, the influence of Hegel and Nietzsche is 
also unmistakable (as is that of Bergson, Jaspers, Scheler, Simmel, and Spengler – all of 
whom he does mention). 
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Thankfully, much of this territory is well trod by eminent scholars,5 and it is not 
my aim to reproduce their efforts. I restrict my comments to identifying ways in which 
the early Heidegger adapts aspects of Husserl’s phenomenology into his methodology. 
However, based upon the chronology of Heidegger’s lectures, the impact of Dilthey and 
the Southwest school of Neo-Kantianism, on the one hand, and Natorp’s psychology, on 
the other, must be accorded a certain pride of place along with Husserlian 
phenomenology when it comes to Heidegger’s initial efforts to hammer out the specific 
subject matter and method of his phenomenology.6 Indeed, Heidegger’s response to both 
Dilthey’s account of historical reality and, as discussed below, Natorp’s account of 
psychology serves as a key catalyst for his transformation of Husserl’s conception of 
phenomenology. When, in the course of the 1920s, Heidegger shifts his attention to 																																																								
5 See Kisiel, van Buren, and Denker et al. for surveys of Heidegger’s early development. 
For his engagement with Husserl, see the studies by Stapleton, von Herrmann, Crowell 
(2001, 2013), Gander, and Overgaard; on the abiding importance of Dilthey, see Scharff 
(esp. Part III); on the influence of the Southwest school, see Bowler and Campbell; on the 
all-important critical reception of Aristotle, see Strube, Brogan, and Sheehan; on 
Heidegger’s phenomenology of religion, see Crowe, Campbell, and McManus.  
6 Heidegger explicitly addresses the Southwest School and Natorp in his first two lectures 
(Heidegger 1999: 29-58, 95-111, 140-203) and Natorp again in the summer semester of 
1920 (Heidegger 1993: 96-174; Zahavi 2003). Both Husserl and Heidegger take on the 
Wissenschaft/Weltanschauung debate raging between the neo-Kantians (especially 
Rickert) and the life-philosophers (notably Dilthey). Thanks to James Kinkaid for this 
reminder. 
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religious experience, sustained readings of Aristotle’s texts, and the transcendental 
framework of Kant’s theoretical philosophy, the historical turn and non-objectifying 
approach that inform his own distinctive phenomenology are already in place. 
 
2. The early Heidegger’s adaptation of Husserlian phenomenology  
By the early 1930s, ‘phenomenology’ is a term invoked less and less by Heidegger to 
characterize his way of thinking, so much so that at one point, as already noted, he 
advises students to restrict the term to its Husserlian sense. Even during the 1920s, when 
he finds the moniker apt enough for his lectures and publications, their themes and 
approaches depart strikingly from those of Husserl’s phenomenology. Here a sampling of 
three differences may suffice.7  
(1) While consciousness and intentionality are the fundamental subjects of 
Husserl’s phenomenological analyses, Heidegger considers them derivative phenomena 
(Husserl 1976: 187f; 1984a: 355-440).8 In Heidegger’s earliest lectures, to be sure, he 
focuses on lived experience, a cognate of consciousness, as he is intent on developing a 
conception of phenomenology as a “pre-theoretical...primordial science” of the pre-given 
experience of factical life (Heidegger 1999: 96f; 1993a: 70f, 78f). But it is “hopeless,” he 
observes in this connection, for any “science of consciousness” to get at life since its 																																																								
7 See the studies by Kisiel, von Herrmann, Crowell, Overgaard, and Sheehan for more 
sustained, at times differing accounts of these issues. 
8 For Heidegger, intentionality is grounded in the transcending that is proper to being-
here (Da-sein) and being-in-the-world – and not vice versa (Heidegger 1989a: 89ff, 230, 
249).  
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goal, a certain “ideal of knowledge,” has torn down all the bridges to it (Heidegger 1993: 
144).9  
(2) Husserl touts phenomenology as a return to die Sachen selbst and what is 
“given” in an originary way (Husserl 1976: 42, 52). By contrast, in Heidegger’s first 
lectures, he debunks appeals to the given, insisting that when we look at the experience of 
the surrounding world, we do not even find “a consciousness of givenness” (Heidegger 
1999: 98).10 The claim that the surrounding world is given to me is misguided (to put it 
mildly; Heidegger actually says that it is verkehrt), since givenness is “very much a 
theoretical form already.... the initial, objectifying encroachment on” experience of the 
surrounding world (Heidegger 1999: 88-89). So, too, what phenomenologists have in 
mind when they speak of die Sachen selbst is typically not so much things themselves 
(and certainly not the quotidian experience of things within the surrounding world) as it is 
the subject matters already carved up by academic traditions. The implication is that the 
much-ballyhooed slogan of returning to the things themselves is in reality a rather 
																																																								
9 The shift from the study of life and lived experience to the sense of being is not abrupt; 
in 1922, to offset stapling (Verklammerung), in Cartesian fashion, ontology together with 
epistemology, Heidegger probes the sense of being of life (“factical life” for which death 
is decisive), requiring in turn the development of a formal concept of history; Heidegger 
2005: 173-81.  
10 This criticism does not stop Heidegger from appealing to “the given” himself in early 
lectures (Heidegger 1999: 70-73; 1993a: 28, 71, 86). 
4/1/16	 H’s	Early	Phenomenology/dahlstrom	 8	
pedestrian compliance with university curriculum (Heidegger 1999: 61-69, 72-76; 1993a: 
150; 1993b: 7f, 45f, 75f).11 
(3) An argument can be made that, in Heidegger’s earliest lectures at the very 
least, he continues to subscribe to the central role that Husserl accords intuition in the 
Sixth Logical Investigation and later reaffirms in the principle of all principles.12 To be 
sure, while affirming the principle, Heidegger adds the qualification – with Bergsonian 
flourishes – that the intuition in question be “hermeneutical” or tied to understanding 
(Heidegger 1999: 65, 109, 117, 219).13 Yet the intuition that corresponds to a filled 
intention for Husserl is intrinsically related to an empty intention, typically some 
meaning or opinion that can be understood or interpreted in the absence of its fulfillment. 
So at this structural level there appears to be little distance between the two thinkers. Yet 
even if for both of them there is no intuition (in the sense of a filled intention) without an 
understanding (a possibly empty intention), Heidegger alone insists on the constitutive 
role played by affectivity in the process. Dasein is always in some mood; there is no 
understanding that is not disposed; and moods are no less fundamentally disclosive 																																																								
11 As with “the given,” Heidegger is anything but consistent when it comes to die Sache 
selbst; see e.g., Heidegger 1993a: 24, 95, 249; 1993b: 30; 1995a: 184; 2005: 178f. 
12 Husserl 1984b: 662: “Entfällt die Anschauung ganz und gar, so erkennt das Urteil 
nichts...” 
13See Heidegger 1993a: 138: “Anschauung und zwar Erlebnisanschauung, d.h. originäre 
genuine Erlebniserfassung...Erfassung hat hier eine eigene nirgends sonst antreffbare 
Gestalt des reinen Verstehens”; see, too, ibid. 184: “Verstehen – als Anschauung – 
Mitgehen mit und in der Fülle der Situation.” 
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(truth-bearing, if you will) than the understanding and discourse (Heidegger 1967: 134, 
137-139, 142, 144, 260). Indeed, the fundamental mood of anxiety provides “the 
phenomenal basis for explicitly grasping Dasein’s primordial totality of being” 
(Heidegger 1967: 182).14  
This list provides, to be sure, only a snapshot of the differences.15 As a snapshot, 
it conveys only one perspective, omitting crucial, often mitigating features of the passing 																																																								
14 Whereas for Husserl every intentional experience is an objectifying act or founded 
upon one and he identifies joy or sadness as founded acts (Husserl 1984a: 514), moods 
for Heidegger ground other acts (Heidegger 1967: 162, 220, 265). On Heidegger’s view, 
perception is not prior, structurally or otherwise, to affectivity, which he primarily 
understands, not in the sense of phenomenal quality, but in connection with Aristotle’s 
sense of ‘ὄρεξις’ (I am grateful to Al and Maria Miller for stressing Heidegger’s 
indebtedness to Aristotle in this regard). Insisting that affective acts ground valuing for 
Husserl and that, in his view, all our experience is of a world somehow valued does not 
counter this objection. Still, the differences between the two thinkers are mitigated by the 
role that Husserl assigns to motivation – and perhaps Heidegger’s reading of the 
manuscript of Ideas II; see Hadjioannou 2015. 
15 The list could be augmented by Heidegger’s insistence on the constituting (i.e., 
unbracketable) character of history (thrownness), the world (a unity of horizons), and 
time’s discontinuousness. Although Husserl and Heidegger share the view that 
subjectivity is fundamentally temporal, i.e., that time in some sense provides the 
condition of possibility of intentionality and other subjective phenomena, the early 
Heidegger’s account of the discontinuity of time points to a substantial difference 
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scene and context. Nevertheless, this fragmentary list suffices to demonstrate how much 
Heidegger, by his own admission, departs in the 1920s from Husserl’s phenomenology. 
But, then, once again, it bears asking: in what sense does he understand his early thinking 
as phenomenology at all? Or is it a misnomer? Any of the three differences glossed above 
might make one think so, especially since Husserl’s work is the marker for what passes 
for phenomenology at the time.  
Yet while Heidegger does not exactly take up the baton passed to him by Husserl, 
during the 1920s he does craft something that he deems ‘phenomenology’ by taking his 
bearings from several of Husserl’s central methodological insights. Both Husserl and 
Heidegger conceive phenomenology primarily as a method and, more specifically, as a 
means to metaphysics and/or ontology (indeed, even at times as its realization) (Husserl 
1950: 32, 58f; 1973a: 38; 1976: 362-68; Heidegger 1967: 27, 37f; 1994a: 60). They also 
jointly conceive it as a way of retrieving something that is relatively hidden from normal 
view, i.e., the sense of things and the constitutive experience of them – the being of 
beings and the disclosure of them in being-here (Da-sein). Heidegger learns and adapts 
from Husserl the lesson that this retrieval requires an analysis that is at once reductive, 
																																																																																																																																																																					
between their analyses of temporality. A more fraught issue is the question of 
presuppositionlessness (see Husserl 1984a: 24f; 1976: 42f; Heidegger 1967: 150). 
Notably, Heidegger later distinguishes between “pre-hermeneutic” and hermeneutic 
phenomenology (Heidegger 1989b: 188).  
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performative, formal, and constitutive.16 Detailing this adaptation – part emulation, part 
transformation – is the objective of the rest of this paper.  
 
2.1 Phenomenology as reductive analysis. Heidegger considers Husserl’s understanding 
of intentionality the first of the decisive discoveries of his phenomenology. Husserl 
articulates the common tripartite structure of intentional experiences or acts, i.e., how the 
relation of act to object invariably includes a way that the respective object is intended. In 																																																								
16 Far from occupying ordinal or exclusive positions, these different aspects of the 
analysis complement and often overlap with one another. The list could be expanded to 
(1) the holistic character of what is analyzed and (2) the aim of determining it in its 
essentials. (1) Just as Husserlian phenomenology analyzes a whole constituted by non-
independent, inherent parts (Momente), so Heidegger’s phenomenology analyzes being-
in-the-world as a “unified phenomenon,” equiprimordially constituted by 
Strukturmomente, such as worldhood, being-with, being-in, and selfhood (Heidegger 
1967: 41, 53, 64, 113, 131, 180, 190). (2) Heidegger’s entire enterprise in Being and Time 
is concerned, no less than Husserl’s phenomenology, with the essence(s) of its subject 
matter. The designation ‘Dasein,’ he notes, is selected precisely to indicate that the 
"essence" of the entity in question consists in having to be its own being (Heidegger 
1967: 12, 42). It is of the very "essence" of Dasein to have an understanding of being, to 
be able to be (Seinkönnen), to have its death before it as a defining potential, to have a 
conscience, and to be capable of being authentic or not (Heidegger 1967: 231, 233, 248, 
262, 278, 42f, 323). His analyses focus on the essences of the respective existentials as 
well as the essence of truth (Heidegger 1967: 190, 214, 222, 296, 314). 
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the terminology of Ideas I, each act (noesis) is directed at an object in terms of a 
purported sense (noema) that is not to be confused with a mental image or idea of the 
object. When I think of the oak tree on my front lawn or when I knowingly see it, the 
object of my thought or cognizant perception is not an image or an idea; it is the tree 
itself. Yet I would not be able to think of it or knowingly see it without a sense of what it 
is. Indeed, even imagining the tree requires a sense of it.  
 Though this structure of intentionality ranges over everything that might afford 
itself to us, this “phenomenological field” itself is hidden.17 It is not in plain sight; it is 
not immediately given. The phenomenologist has to shift her focus from the things 
directly intended to the way that they are intended and to her intentionality itself. This 
shift requires bracketing the “entire natural world” in which we normally, in our natural 
attitude, find ourselves as well as any appeal to sciences which presuppose this world. Set 
aside are not only empirical disciplines such as psychology and physiology, but even the 
humanities (Geisteswissenschaften) insofar as they study conscious states as events 
taking place, broadly speaking, within nature. Once the natural attitude and all the 
sciences within it are bracketed, the phenomenologist is in a position to attend 
exclusively to what presents itself to human subjectivity in the phenomenological field. If 
everything encompassed by the natural attitude “in an ontic respect” is thus put “out of 
																																																								
17 Thus, Husserl observes that consciousness, hitherto unfamiliar (unbekannt), has to be 
made accessible to us, that we live in the cogito, without consciously having the cogitatio 
as an object (Husserl 1976: 68, 77, 95-97). 
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play,” as Husserl puts it, “there remains a region of being, in principle unique, which can, 
indeed, become the field of a new science - that of phenomenology.”18  
 This description of phenomenology and its reductive method could equally be 
given, without the slightest alteration, to the phenomenology that Heidegger regards as 
the ontological method in Being and Time. Indeed, if one stresses the bracketing of things 
naturally taken up in an “ontic respect,” and takes the genitive in “region of being” as an 
appositive or possessive rather than a partitive or objective genitive, its suitability to 
Heidegger’s conception is even more pronounced. Heidegger, too, insists that ontic 
considerations of human existence, specifically in the sciences of anthropology, 
psychology, and biology, be set aside in an effort to unpack its ontological sense, that is 
to say, to provide “an ontological analysis of the subjectivity of the subject” (Heidegger 
1976: 24).19 Heidegger's project requires the exclusion of any attempt to understand what 
'to be' means by referring it to some being, be it God or nature, as though it were 
explicable in a way analogous to the way in which one being within the world is said to 
be explained or caused by another (Heidegger 1967: 6). By the same token, in the effort 
to understand being-in-the-world as such, all otherwise legitimate efforts to comprehend 
human beings as transcendent objects, simply on-hand within the world, must be put out 																																																								
18 Husserl 1976: 68; see, too, 158f: "Durch die phänomenologische Reduktion hatte sich 
uns das Reich des transzendentalen Bewusstseins als des in einem bestimmten Sinn 
>>absoluten<< Seins ergeben." 
19 For other positive invocations of subjectivity to characterize Dasein, see Heidegger 
1976, 106, 229, 278, 382. For first alerting me to the positive senses of ‘subjectivity’ in 
SZ, contrary to Heidegger’s later position, I am indebted to Klaus Düsing. 
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of play. “This particular being does not have and never has the sort of being of something 
merely on-hand [vorhanden] within the world” (Heidegger 1967: 43).20  
Heidegger also imports into his own account of phenomenology the Husserlian 
motif, mentioned above, of retrieving the hidden.  
[The theme of phenomenology] is obviously what does not, initially and 
for the most part, show itself, what is hidden relative to what shows itself 
initially and for the most part, but at the same time is something 
essentially belonging to what shows itself in this way, indeed, such that it 
makes up its sense and ground. (Heidegger 1967: 35) 
That hidden “sense and ground” is, Heidegger continues, the “being of beings,” but since 
there can be no study of being in the abstract but only the being of a particular being, 
Heidegger begins with the analysis of the being of the particular being with an 
understanding of being, i.e., Dasein. And its being is only availed by bracketing ontic 
studies, reducing what is to be analyzed (what initially shows itself) to its being. 
In Heidegger’s published lectures, he retains but also transforms the reduction. In 
the winter semester of 1919/20 he puts a positive spin on the transcendental reduction. 
After noting how the reduction enables us to set free the “implicit relations” in factical 
life with the purpose of grasping, on the basis of them, the “basic sense” of the 
experienced domain, he adds that this sense is determined by those relations since “the 																																																								
20 To be sure, Heidegger does not use the term ‘reduction’ to describe this aspect of his 
method, but in his first Marburg lectures he attributes this very aspect to Husserl’s 
“transcendental reduction” and contrasts the latter with Descartes’ remotio; see 
Heidegger 2006: 80, 258-60. 
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phenomenological comportment (towards itself) is ... not knowledge of an object at all” 
(Heidegger 1993: 249f ).21 Instead it is a way of going along with (Mitgehen) or co-
enacting (Mitmachen) the experiences themselves (Heidegger 1993a: 23, 81, 123f, 162f, 
185). Heidegger concedes that the reduction can be construed as a way of withdrawing 
from the experience of living, but he adds that this characterization represents only “the 
negative side of the matter,” one that regards all experiences as intentional and, in 
addition, takes its bearings from perceptions as experiences of grasping things (Heidegger 
1993a: 162n.23, 249f, 254f). 
These last remarks may already signal a difference from Husserl’s use of the 
reduction. So it is perhaps not surprising to read Heidegger, in the summer of 1925, 
charging that the phenomenological reduction in Husserl’s hands is “fundamentally unfit 
to determine positively the being of consciousness” (Heidegger 1994: 150).22 Two years 
later, in the summer of 1927, he describes the phenomenological reduction as his method 
of redirecting attention from the comprehension of beings to the understanding of their 
being. But he also makes it clear that this description hooks up with a central term of 																																																								
21 See, however, Heidegger 1993: 151, 156 where Heidegger criticizes the reduction, 
when performed from an “epistemological” or “foregoing transcendental standpoint.” 
This criticism echoes his point about the negative side of the reduction, to which he 
counterpoises the positive side that entails his account of the three senses (content, 
performative, and relational); see  ibid: 162 n. 23.  
22 Heidegger’s remarks, in his first Marburg lectures, about the Cartesian tendencies alive 
in Husserl’s use of first a transcendental and then an eidetic reduction anticipate this 
criticism (Heidegger 2002: 273f). 
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Husserl’s phenomenology in words only, since for Husserl it means re-directing attention 
to “the transcendental life of consciousness” (Heidegger 1989a: 29). Heidegger justifies 
his different use of the reduction with the observation that phenomenological method, 
like any scientific method, “grows and transforms itself” in the process of pressing ahead 
to the matters in question. 
 Heidegger’s early phenomenology thus deliberately pursues a reductive analysis, 
albeit in a sense that just as deliberately departs from its original Husserlian sense. 
Heidegger even adds two distinctive twists, historical and existential, to the method of 
reduction as he takes it up into his phenomenology. His aim is to pose the question of the 
sense of being (Sinn des Seins) and, accordingly, as a means of exposing and thereby 
bracketing “the fatal prejudice” that prevents the question from being raised, he builds 
into his phenomenological project the task of dismantling the history of ontology 
(Heidegger 1967: 3-4, 21, 25). Heidegger develops the ground for this historical 
modification of the reduction in his early lectures by explaining the need for 
“phenomenological destruction.”23 In addition, the first section of Being and Time is 
nothing less than an attempt to elaborate and then bracket the inauthentic (though 
nonetheless telling) ways in which human beings project (intend, are related to) 																																																								
23 See Heidegger 1993b: 12, 29-38; in this lecture (summer semester 1920), after 
explaining the sense and necessity of phenomenological destruction, Heidegger applies it 
to what he regards as the two main groups of philosophical problems among his 
contemporaries, i.e., the problem of the a priori or ultimate validation and the problem of 
the irrational or lived experience. There is, nonetheless, an analogous sense of destruction 
in Ideas I (Husserl 1976: 100) – and Luther! (Crowe 2005). 
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themselves, others, and things within the world, ways in which what “being” means for 
them in each case is constituted and disclosed. Only by virtue of this existential reduction 
can there be any assurance of disclosing what it means for humans, in the authentic sense 
of the term, “to be.”  
 
2.2 Phenomenology as performative analysis. Reflection is arguably the basic operation 
of Husserlian phenomenology. Despite its defeasible character (recognized by Husserl 
early on), any possibility of discerning the forms of intentionality immanently, i.e., on 
their own terms, rests on making them objects of reflection. Herein lies, too, Husserlian 
phenomenology’s necessary recourse to the essentially first-personal character of 
experience. The reduction and the reflection are operations that the phenomenologist has 
to perform for herself to gain access to the distinctiveness of imagining, perceiving, 
speaking, knowing, and so on.24 A phenomenologist can and, indeed, must reflect on her 
own reflections, making them in turn into objects of reflection. But typically we live 
through our experiences unreflectively, and it takes a phenomenological reflection to 
bring their essential character to light.  
Critics (e.g., Natorp) have questioned the very prospect of understanding 
experiences by making them into objects of reflection and description. While the early 
Heidegger shares some of these misgivings, he is completely on board with Husserl when 
it comes to what motivates reflection, namely, the need to retrieve what is typically 																																																								
24 See Husserl’s reference to einsame Selbstbesinnungen as the genuine beginning of 
philosophy and the radikale Selbstverantwortung des Philosophierenden (Husserl 1988: 
169).  
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hidden from us, namely, our being itself, equipped with its own inherent understanding of 
being. He also shares Husserl’s methodological insight into the first-person character of 
the method of phenomenological analysis, i.e., appreciation of the fact that no one else 
can do it for you.  
Especially relevant in this connection is Husserl’s analysis of categorial intuition, 
touted by Heidegger as the second major discovery (after intentionality) of Husserl’s 
phenomenology. A “categorial intuition” is so-called because it is the act of directly 
grasping what traditionally falls under the “categorial,” e.g., conjunctions, disjunctions, 
states of affairs, collectives, universals, and – not least – being! Yet, on Heidegger’s 
reading, the act is ubiquitous, “invested in the most everyday perception and every 
experience” (Heidegger 1994b: 64f ). Hand-in-hand with this ubiquitousness is a more or 
less articulable (not necessarily verbalized) understanding, what Heidegger in his earliest 
lectures deemed, as noted above, “hermeneutical intuition.”25 On Heidegger’s reading, 
phenomenology consists in reflective, categorial intuitions of pre-reflective, but no less 
categorial intuitions. Something similar applies to his own phenomenological attempt to 
understand pre-thematic understanding and experience.  
One salient way that Heidegger signals the performative character of his analysis 
(i.e., again, akin to reflection) is by indicating it formally and thereby conveying it to 
others. He states that all philosophical concepts are formally indicative (Heidegger 1983: 
																																																								
25 See n. 13 above. 
4/1/16	 H’s	Early	Phenomenology/dahlstrom	 19	
422), but so are philosophical propositions (Heidegger 1988: 80),26 determinations 
(Heidegger 1994a: 52; 1967: 114), and questions (Heidegger 1994a: 172). Philosophy 
itself, its definition, and its task are indicated formally (Heidegger 1994a: 19f, 32-36; 43f, 
45).27 So, too, are various themes in terms of which this task is pursued, e.g., ‘living,’ 
‘caring,’ ‘being in a world,’ ‘existing,’ and so on.28  
Formal indications provide a point of departure, direction, and certain constraints 
for Heidegger’s phenomenology, but their full meaning requires co-enacting what is 
indicated. By formally indicating a theme like ‘caring,’ Heidegger is conveying to his 
students the need to understand something that they already do, a way of behaving that 
they already have, without objectifying it, i.e., presuming some ready-made content for it. 
These indications are formal in the sense that they are bereft of any such content. Instead 																																																								
26 Whereas taking the proposition cogito in a formal-ontological sense (i.e., as res 
cogitans) perverts its meaning, taking it in a “formally indicative” sense opens us to its 
temporality and what the ego has; see Heidegger 2006: 250.  
27 Heidegger may be drawing on Husserl’s remarks (in the First Logical Investigation) 
about indications, in contrast to expressions, and, more specifically, how speech can 
indicate to a listener the presence of a hidden mental act. 
28 Formal indications include ‘life’ (Heidegger 1993b: 29); uses of ‘I,’ ‘is,’ ‘has’ (1995a: 
147); ‘I am’ (1994a: 172ff; 1967: 116); ‘caring’ and ‘critique’ (2005: 92, 183ff); ‘being 
in a world’ (1988: 80); ‘care’ (2006: 279); being-here’s ‘fundamental determinacy’ and 
the ‘constitution of its being’ (1967: 114, 117); ‘existence’ (ibid: 231, 313). Similarly, the 
sense of certain terms can be used in a “formally indicative” manner and something can 
be disclosed in this way (Heidegger 1995a: 55, 63f; 1967: 315). 
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they indicate what cannot be understood from a standpoint outside a basic experience but 
can only be understood by enacting the experience from within and interpreting the sense 
of it accordingly (Heidegger 1994a: 55, 60).29 They point, in other words, to the 
outstanding (reflexive) task of taking possession of our ways of behaving and their 
sense.30 As such, they are also prohibitions, warning the phenomenologist to ward off 
pre-emptive meanings, not least the presumption that the phenomenologist herself is not 
implicated in the task at hand. Formal indications point to the necessity of retrieving the 
sense of a relation (Bezug) afforded only by a certain enactment or performance 
(Vollzug). Far from being given in advance or without further ado, the content of a formal 
indication is precisely the sort “whose appropriation is a concrete task of enactment of its 
own” (Heidegger 1994a: 32, 61, 52f).31 In all these ways, Heidegger’s use of formal 
indications reprises the performative character of Husserlian reflection.  																																																								
29 See Heidegger 1993a: 161: “keine Objektivierung, keine Objektsanschauung, sondern 
Mitgehen des Lebens in sich selbst.” Ibid: 248, 254f. 
30 On the task indicated, see Heidegger 1994a: 60; 1993b: 85; on the direction, binding 
point of departure, and reflexivity of the indicated behavior, see Heidegger 1994a: 31-35, 
60-63, 113, 134; 1995a: 64; on being rooted in the relational, material, and – above all – 
enactment sense (Vollzugssinn) of behaving (Verhalten), see Heidegger 1994a: 52f.  
31 Some formal indications drawn from factical life point to basic snares within it 
(Heidegger 1994a: 140ff); the performative aspect of formal indications is to offset the 
formal-ontological determinacy that has hitherto “completely” dominated philosophy 
(Heidegger 1995a: 63f; see also Dahlstrom 1994, Streeter 1997, Overgaard 2004, 
Shockey 2010, Burch 2011). 
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2.3 Phenomenology as formal analysis. Throughout the existential analysis in SZ, 
Heidegger explicitly develops and employs an array of “formal” structures, senses, 
determinations, scaffoldings, differentiations, pre-delineations, characteristics, concepts – 
and, of course, indications (Heidegger 1967: 5, 31, 52, 114, 155f, 159, 179, 255, 267, 
269, 241, 282, 285, 319, 327, 342).32 So, too, he notes “the formal sense of the research 
that gives itself the name ‘phenomenology, ’” “the formal sense of the constitution of the 
existence of Dasein,” “the formal concept” and “the formal idea” of existence (Heidegger 
1967: 34, 43, 53, 179, 314). He warns, to be sure, against lapses into an “’external,’ 
formal interpretation” or formalizations at odds with the analysis (e.g., formalizing signs 
into a system of formal relations or time into a sequence of nows) (Heidegger 1967: 
60).33 But he also urges the importance of formalization, for example, in the case of 
spelling out the idea of guilt and dissolving its connection to concepts of “a should and 
law” that suppose manners of being proper to what is on hand rather than to Dasein 
(Heidegger 1967: 283).34  
 This reliance upon formalization in Being and Time is an adaptation of Husserl’s 
account of formalization. Heidegger refers to Husserl’s account in a footnote, albeit in a 
gloss of the sort of formalization that he finds of little use to the analysis (Heidegger 																																																								
32 So, too, he formulates “formal, existential” expressions, “formally existential” ideas, 
and a “formally existential totality” (Heidegger 1967: 22, 54, 192, 283). 
33 On formalizing relations, see Heidegger 1967: 77f, 88, 159f, 208, 215; on formalizing 
time, see ibid: 432.  
34 For another positive sense of formalization, see Heidegger 1967: 147. 
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1967: 77 n. 1). In 1920 he makes a similarly dismissive remark, while differentiating 
formal indications from formalization in Husserl’s sense.35 In his very first Freiburg 
lecture, however, he comes to Husserl’s defense by invoking the process of 
formalization.  
 Heidegger cites Natorp’s objection to Husserl’s depiction of phenomenology as a 
descriptive science, on the grounds that descriptions, far from being innocuous, are 
inherently “objectifying” and generic, embedded in some implicit or explicit theoretical 
explanation.36 Heidegger responds that the notion that every description expressed in 
words is inherently objectifying is an “unproven prejudice.” So, too, is the presumption 
(Vormeinung) that the only sort of universality is the theoretical universality attaching to 
a genus and that the meanings of words contain only this sort of universality. While we 
can construe anything in more or less generic and specific terms (e.g., x is brown, what is 
brown is a color, what is a color is a sensation, what is a sensation is a psychological or 
physiological process), we can also construe it at each step more formally as something 
in general (e.g., what is brown is something, what is a color is something, etc.). While the 
former sort of theorizing is limited to a specific sphere of reality, the latter (“formal 
theorizing”) is not, and what motivates it must be qualitatively different from the former.  
																																																								
35 The “formal” character of formal indication is “more primordial” than that of 
formalization; moreover, in contrast to generalization and formalization, a “formal 
indication has nothing to do with the universal” (Heidegger 1995a: 59-62). 
36 The charge of “objectifying” is fatal, in Natorp’s view, since description thus allegedly 
rules out a science of the subjective (Heidegger 1999: 101, 111). 
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Heidegger’s rejoinder to Natorp, at least up to this point, merely iterates Husserl’s 
distinction between formalization and generalization. But in an obvious extension of 
Husserlian formalization, Heidegger adds that there is a way of formally theorizing or 
objectifying that is “free” from the motivations and sources of the theoretical content or 
subject matters (Sachen) of particular sciences (Heidegger 1999: 114-17). In addition to 
theoretical formalizations and generalizations, there is, Heidegger submits, a purely 
formal mode of discerning and articulating things independently of any particular 
theoretical form or content. Phenomenology approaches its “object” (Gegenstand)37 
formally, i.e., in a way that steers a course between individual life as such (including 
autobiography) and universalizations of it (material or formal ontology).  
 
2.4 Phenomenology as constitutive analysis. ‘Constitution’ is a mereological word of art 
that Husserl employs to examine how something is constituted in or for (but not created 
by) consciousness, how consciousness constitutes it, and how consciousness itself is 
																																																								
37 While Objekt is reserved for the theoretical sphere, “the formally objective” 
(Gegenständliche) and “[formal] objectification” (Vergegenständlichung) characterize a 
formal way of looking at things that is not bound to any theory (material or formal 
ontological); see Heidegger 1989a: 458. Similarly, formal indications, while providing an 
access to theology, are not the “ultimate understanding, that can only be given in genuine 
religious experience” (Heidegger 1995a: 67).  
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constituted.38 In his early works, he principally conceives the constitution as a synthesis 
of an intentional act (e.g., an apprehension) and its content (e.g., the content 
apprehended).39 Grasping, in a perception, that the tree before me is an oak consists in an 
act of apprehending (Auffassung) some sensory givens (Inhalt) as part of the way an oak 
tree presents itself. The apprehension “animates” (forms) the sensory givens (content) as 
the givens of an oak tree.  
This synchronic, hylomorphic model of the sense-constituting consciousness 
supposes the constitution of the sensory givens but without offering an explanation for 
them. (How is it that they afford themselves to such acts of perception and judgment?) 
Aware of this problem early on his career (Husserl 1968: 121ff, 128; Husserl 1980: 265f), 
Husserl comes to see that “not every constitution has the schema apprehension-
content/apprehension” (Husserl 1969: 7n, 137-51; Husserl 1973a: 79f ). He accordingly 
develops a genetic model of how sensations are constituted that coincides with internal 																																																								
38 On what is constituted and the constituting acts, see Husserl 1984b: 674f; Husserl 
1976: 180, 196ff, 272-75, 335, 344, 355; see, too, Husserl 1994b: 460f (on the 
constitution of personality, environment, and the life of consciousness).  
39 See the distinction between quality of an act (e.g., whether it is a question, a wish, a 
judgment), its sense or matter (e.g., what the act posits, which can be common to 
different qualities of act), and the sensory input that somehow bear the sense (Husserl 
1984a: 397f, 427ff); in Ideas I, what constitutes perceptual consciousness is a noetic 
component (an intentional act with its distinctive quality), a noematic component (the 
sense), and a hyletic component (certain non-intentional sensory givens); Husserl 1976: 
196, 352. 
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time-consciousness. A temporal constitution thus underlies and makes possible the 
hylomorphic account of intentionality in at least two respects. Whereas the perception 
that the tree before me is an oak consists in apprehending sensory contents a certain way, 
i.e., with a certain sense, neither the sensory contents themselves nor the ultimate level of 
consciousness itself is constituted by forming some material. Instead they are alike 
constituted by the temporal flow of conscious life (Husserl 1969: 156f, 239-248, 358-82; 
Zahavi 2004: 104). 
Heidegger’s phenomenology, too, is replete with constitutive analyses operative 
on multiple levels, with the genetic constitution of temporality providing the most basic 
sense of other levels. He contrasts existential with the existentiel understanding by noting 
that the latter does not require “the theoretical transparency of the ontological structure of 
existence.” The question of the latter aims at the analysis of “what constitutes existence” 
(italics added) and he follows up by citing “an understanding of the being of everything 
that is not Dasein” as a constituting feature (Konstituens) of the understanding of 
existence (Heidegger 1967: 12f). In addition to concentrating on other constitutive 
features of Dasein (worldhood, being-in, and being-with), he analyzes attunement and 
understanding under the heading “the existential constitution of the Da.”40 Discourse is 
“constitutive” for attunement and understanding and he analyzes it in turn in terms of its 
“constitutive moments” (Heidegger 1967: 162, 165). Disclosedness, the sort of being that 																																																								
40 So, too, while the world is a “constitutive” of Dasein, a referential complex 
“constitutes” worldhood in turn (along with what is handy), and being-in-the-world is 
“essentially constituted,” too, by being-with; Heidegger 1967: 52f, 64, 68, 76, 78, 83, 88, 
120f, 124f. 
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is fundamental for Dasein, is “constituted” by attunement, understanding, and discourse 
(Heidegger 1967: 220, 269).  
 In the second section of Being and Time, Heidegger continues to characterize his 
existential analyses, the analyses of the themes of dying, conscience, and resoluteness, as 
constitutive analyses.41 But more importantly, for our purposes, Heidegger, echoing 
Husserl’s genetic model of constitution, offers an analysis of how time constitutes the 
basic sense of these existential themes. Dasein is constituted by three “constitutive,” non-
independent features of care, namely, its facticity (thrownness), existence (projection), 
and its fallenness. By making possible the unity of these “moments,” temporality 
“constitutes,” in a primordial way, the structure of care as a whole (Heidegger 1967: 315, 
324, 328, 331).  
To be sure, the structural similarities between Heidegger’s constitutive analyses 
and Husserl’s should not obscure the enormous differences in content and direction. Yet 
it is not surprising, given the similarities, that in Being and Time Heidegger explicitly 
calls attention to Husserl’s published and unpublished analyses of constitution 
(Heidegger 1967: 47 n. 1). 
 
Conclusion: a basic difference 
In the body of this paper I have tried to demonstrate how fundamentally the early 
Heidegger’s phenomenology improvises upon Husserl’s groundbreaking development of 																																																								
41 Death, constitutive of Dasein in its entirety, is “ontologically constituted by mineness 
and existence” (Heidegger 1967: 240, 245, 252). Conscience guilt, and resoluteness are 
also constitutive of Dasein (ibid: 270, 284-86, 297). 
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phenomenology. Just as Heidegger gives new meaning to phenomenological reduction, 
formalization, and constitutive analysis, so, too, no one would mistake the enactment of 
what his method formally indicates for a Husserlian reflection. Yet it remains true, all the 
same, that Husserl’s phenomenology is the sine qua non of Heidegger’s.  
But, then, how is the difference between them to be explained? Among the many 
plausible answers to this question, one stands out. In several places Husserl not only 
equates being an object with being a possible object of consciousness, but also insists that 
there is nothing posited on the basis of an inadequately given appearance that cannot be 
rendered adequate.42 Let’s call this contention (i.e., that everything can in principle be 
given adequately) ‘the principle of adequate givenness’ (PAG).43 The principle begs for 																																																								
42 Husserl 1966: 20f: “Ein Gegenstand der ist, aber nicht, und prinzipiell nicht 
Gegenstand eines Bewusstseins sein könnte, ist ein Nonsens.” Husserl 1976: 319: 
“...keine auf ... einer inadäquat gebenden Erscheinung beruhende Vernunftsetztung 
[kann] ... unüberwindlich sein....” See also Husserl 1976: 100f, 321, 329; Husserl 1984b: 
680.  
43 PAG is not inconsistent with Husserl’s insistence that we perceive things inadequately, 
that they necessarily present themselves only in “profiles,” “one-sidedly” (something that 
supposedly holds even for a divine mind) (Husserl 1976: 88, 91, 351). In Ding und Raum, 
after observing “...das Ding als ganzes ist nie endgültig gegeben,” Husserl notes that the 
relevant appearance entails the possibility of fulfillment, more precisely, a 
“kontinuierlich-einheitlichen Erscheinungszusammenhang, in dem...die Bestimmtheiten 
zu ‘vollkommener’ Gegebenheit kommen würden” (Husserl 1973c: 121-25). Again, PAG 
(which applies to essences no less than things) is not about actual adequacy but about its 
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further clarification, to be sure, particularly standing as it does for a goal (indeed, an 
infinite one at that) rather than an accomplishment.44 Yet how Husserl would be able to 
substantiate it, at least on a straightforward reading, is beyond me. Leaving aside a 
divine, un-embodied mind (to which nothing, strictly speaking, appears, let alone 
inadequately), how are we (or finite, embodied minds like ours) to know that something 
has been rendered adequate in contrast to what was posited on the basis of an appearance 
inadequately given, once the appearance is over? Why should we suppose that there is 
nothing given in perception, i.e., through appearances, that cannot be given perfectly? 
More importantly for our purposes is how sharply Heidegger’s views contrast 
with this principle. Being closed off and being covered over are inherent to the facticity 
of being-here. Insofar as Dasein is disclosed, it is also closed off, and, to whatever extent 
something within the world is uncovered, it is also “concealed or obscured as something 
that can be encountered within the world.” Disclosing being-here in one respect means 
closing off access to it in another; we do not uncover things in one respect without 
covering them up in another. In short (in Heidegger’s shorthand), we are 
“equiprimordially” in the truth and in the untruth, the unhiddenness and hiddenness, 
																																																																																																																																																																					
possibility, echoed in subjunctives about the possibility of endless progress towards 
adequacy.  
44 To start with, what adequate or perfect givenness in this connection means (i.e., in 
connection with the givenness of what is perceived) is itself puzzling. 
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respectively, of being (Heidegger 1967: 222).45 Let’s call Heidegger’s conviction here 
‘the principle of the hiddenness of being.’46 
The contrast between the two principles could not be sharper. Although 
Heidegger’s position strikes me as far more plausible, he offers no more in the way of an 
argument for being’s inherent hiddenness than Husserl does for the adequate givenness of 
things in principle. Nor is it clear to me how enacting some formally indicated operation 
would be sufficient to rule out the force of Husserl’s principle. Perhaps the difference 
between these two principles reflects a philosophical impasse of the first order, where 
there is no common ground on which to adjudicate the conflicting intuitions in play.  
This conclusion is dissatisfying, to say the least, but it helps explain the 
divergence between the two phenomenologies. Husserl’s confidence in the prospects of 
philosophy as a rigorous science rests in no small measure on his commitment to the 
principle of adequate givenness. Heidegger, by contrast, lacks Husserl’s confidence, and 																																																								
45 Though more pronounced in his later work, Heidegger drives home this point in 1929 
by pointing out how “slipping away” – the chief characteristic of nothingness and the 
various forms of nihilating (the harshness of opposing, the shrillness of loathing, the 
painfulness of failing, the unsparing character of forbidding, and the bitterness of going 
without) – is inherent to the being of beings; Heidegger 2004b: 117, 120. 
46 This hiddenness includes both the hiddenness of the unhiddenness – i.e., 
(metonymically) the being – of beings and the hiddenness presupposed by that 
unhiddenness – i.e., the hiddenness without which that unhiddenness is devoid of 
meaning (in keeping with Heidegger’s reading of the privative alpha in ἀ-λήθεια; see 
Heidegger 1967: 222).  
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his conviction of being’s inherent hiddenness leads him to a “fundamentally different” 
inquiry. As Heidegger himself puts it in 1929: 
And the difference between Husserl and me is not simply this, that Husserl 
develops the problem of phenomenology in a completely abstract way 
(that I should have further posed the problem of consciousness), but that 
my inquiry is a fundamentally different one. It is directed at the being of 
being-here at all, in order to procure the ground for metaphysics. Standing 
behind this [effort] is my conviction that metaphysics and philosophy in 
general cannot be placed on an exact foundation, that in the sense of a 
rigorous science they are impossible. Philosophy necessarily moves much 
more in an abyss that is open, to be sure, only as long as there is concrete 
philosophizing (Heidegger 2011: 310; 137-138). 
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